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University Knowledge, Originality of Patents and 
the Creation of New Industries 
 
Marco Guerzoni1, T. Taylor Aldridge2, David B. Audretsch3 and Sameeksha Desai4 
Abstract  
Scientific breakthroughs emanating from universities can be a trigger for the emergence 
of new industries such as in the paradigmatic case of biotechnology. Obviously, not all research 
conducted in the universities leads to radical departure from the existing technological 
trajectories. When a patent protection is granted to a discovery, it is possible to construct a proxy 
for the originality of the discovery based on patent citations. Patent originality has been long 
recognized in fostering the emergence of new technologies and industries. However, while a 
large body of literature exists measuring the impact of patent originality on a broad range of 
measures of firm performance, this paper aims at investigating the conditions driving patent 
originality. In particular, in providing the first empirical examination of the determinants of 
patent originality, this paper finds that the research context, as reflected by the funding source for 
the scientist, influences the extent to which intellectual property protected by a patent is original. 
Eventually, we propose that university scientists funded by their university, which has a more 
fundamental mission, have a higher propensity to generate patents that are more original. By 
contrast, university scientists funded either by industry or other non-university organizations 
have a lower propensity to generate more original patents. 
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1. Introduction 
The emergence of biotechnology in the 1970s provides a prototype for emergent 
industries. The commercialization of new knowledge played a key role. In the case of 
biotechnology, the underlying knowledge was developed in the university context by Herbert 
Boyer of the University of California at San Francisco and Stanley Cohen at Stanford University. 
Their laboratory experiments provided a compelling demonstration of the vast potential for DNA 
recombinant engineering to revolutionize not just agricultural products but also medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products as well. 
It took more than the scientific breakthroughs emanating from universities to launch 
biotechnology.  Rather, patent protection of key intellectual property provided a key platform for 
commercialization of the underlying science and its transformation into the new biotechnology 
products. The originality of the patents reflects the extent to which the underlying intellectual 
property developed by Boyer and Cohen was a radical departure from the extant technological 
trajectories.  
Jaffe, A., Henderson, R. and M. Trajtenberg (1998) and Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Romer 
(2005) introduced and refined an important methodology for measuring the originality of a 
patent. Patent originality has been used in a number of studies to identify a broad range of 
measures reflecting firm performance, such as growth and survival (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 
2002; and Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Romer, 2005). However, while patent originality has been 
extensively used to explain firm performance, there are virtually no studies explicitly identifying 
those factors conducive to patent originality. 
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The purpose of this paper is to explicitly analyze why some patents exhibit more 
originality than do others. In the following section, we draw on the literature initiated by Nelson 
and Winter (1982) and Dosi (1982) concerning the roles of technology trajectories and emergent 
technologies to develop a series of hypotheses linking patent originality to the research context in 
which the intellectual property was created. In particular, we propose that university scientists 
funded by their university, which has a more fundamental mission, have a higher propensity to 
generate patents that are more original. By contrast, university scientists funded either by 
industry or other non-university organizations have a lower propensity to generate more original 
patents. In the third and fourth sections of this paper, we subject these hypotheses to empirical 
scrutiny using a database linking patents by university scientists to their particular funding 
sources. In the last section of the paper, a summary and conclusions are presented. In particular, 
in providing the first empirical examination of the determinants of patent originality, this paper 
finds that the research context, as reflected by the funding source for the scientist, influences the 
extent to which intellectual property protected by a patent is original. 
2. Originality and Emerging Technologies 
The importance of innovation in stimulating productivity and economic growth has long 
been recognized in economic thought. For instance, according to Adam Smith, the division of 
labor allowed workers to do their jobs better and generate new methods of production, thereby 
driving economic growth. Later, Schumpeter introduced the concept of creative destruction as 
the constant introduction of innovations, rendering older things obsolete and fueling  qualitative 
economic advancement  (Schumpeter, 1942). From a different perspective, Solow used empirical 
evidence to reach the conclusion that the variation of output over time cannot be explained by 
variations of inputs only but rather, and to a larger extent, by qualitative technical change 
(Solow, 1967). Finally, since Arrow’s seminal work (1962) growth theories and new growth 
theories developed various models to explain growth and variation in growth rates, highlighting 
the importance of labor productivity.  
As important question in studying change in economic systems concerns the determinants 
of the innovation process, such as drivers of its rate and direction. Dosi (1982) and Nelson and 
Winter (1982) provided a compelling theoretical framework considering technology as 
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knowledge, which includes not only knowledge codified in blueprints, manuals, publications, 
and patents but also know-how and organizational capabilities, which exhibit a tacit nature. Tacit 
knowledge (e.g. related to technical know-how or non-standard production) is costly to transfer, 
and transferability is limited by its embeddedness in individuals, teams and organizations. 
Moreover, if technology is perceived as knowledge embedded in individuals and organizations, 
its rate and direction are also driven by individual cognitive processes. In this view, Dosi (1982) 
introduced the concept of technological paradigm and trajectory. Technological paradigm  
defines the set of common heuristic, institutionalized ideas in a specific technological field and 
shared views about the future development of an artifact; technological trajectories include the 
selective, and cumulative nature of technological progress within a paradigm (Dosi, 1988). This 
approach to economics of innovationsuggests that the search process in discovery does not freely 
explore all the space of technological opportunities but is focused on a specific path which builds 
up on past knowledge and which is difficult to change.  
The path-dependency of the technological progress is not per se a problem for a techno-
economic system. For instance, many benefits can be derived from the continuous progress along 
a technological trajectory such as a higher level of predictability of research output, faster 
learning economies due to simplification and routinization of the process, scale economies, and 
easier production of complementary assets and components’ interfaces. Over time, standardized 
knowledge on a technological trajectory allows an efficient routinization of the innovation 
processes by creating order and consequently reducing uncertainty. However, over time, path-
dependency can end up in a cost of missed opportunities. New possibilities can arise along a 
different trajectory, or in times of revolutionary science, as part of a new scientific or 
technological paradigm. In these cases, cognitive and economic barriers due to path-dependency 
can hinder the shift of the system towards the new path. Even more, they can distort researcher 
assessment and introduce myopic behavior and status quo bias in the exploitation of the 
technological opportunities (David 1985). In this situation, an economic system can benefit from 
the production of original knowledge.Following Hall et al. (2001), originality refers to the 
characteristic of knowledge which does not cumulatively rely on knowledge from a specific 
trajectory and thus, which is able to escape the path-dependency trap. Original knowledge is a 
potential source of new ideas which can open new sectors and industries relying  upon 
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knowledge outside the existent  technological path. Under the assumption of technological 
progress, which works in the way described by Dosi (1982, 1988), a system needs the ability to 
generate a certain degree of original knowledge to avoid severe technological lock-ins. 
However, research oriented towards originality is rarely pursued by firms. As noted by 
Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), basic knowledge cannot always be used directly by the firm 
introducing it. Moreover, in this view, technology is simple information with the nature of a 
quasi-public good, reproducible at zero marginal cost, non-rival, and non-excludable (at least 
without the intervention of some institutions). Agarwal, Henderson and Bohner(2002) posit that 
such systematic underfunding of basic inventions results from a strong association of applied 
inventions with commercial success and inappropriability of results from basic inventions. The 
returns of investment in basic research are thus not fully appropriable by the innovator, and in 
equilibrium, this could lead to underinvestment with respect to a social optimum. Firms also 
have little incentive to invest in original knowledge because of the uncertainty linked with it. In 
an attempt to integrate theory on investment behavior and theory on searching capabilities, 
Henderson (1993) focused on sources of resistance to change. Martin and Scott (2000) discuss 
the lack of incentives for firms to invest in original and general knowledge. Their taxonomy 
includes factors ranging from limited appropriability, uncertainty, to lack of competencies. 
The lack of incentives for firms to invest in original and general research has been the 
rationale since the World War II for public funding of university research. Combined with the 
traditional role of universities in reproducing existing knowledge(Martin 2003), policymakers 
financed universities to pursue research for its own sake (Geuna 2001). Research taking place in 
universities has been shown to play a key role in technological and other advancements. 
University research activities have been linked to product and process innovations (11% and 9% 
respectively; see Mansfield 1991) and productivity growth in private industry (Adams 1990). 
Some industries have seen important improvements related to university research, such as drug  
(Toole 2007) and pharmaceutical industry innovation contributing to lower hospital cost and 
increased life expectancy (Lichtenberg 2001, 2003). Other industries, such as biotechnology in 
the US, have been shaped in large part by university research (see Czarnitzki et al. 2011; Zucker 
and Darby 1997 and. 1999). 
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However, since the early 1980s, a shift in the rationale and nature of research funding has 
occurred in universities in both in the US and in Europe. As Geuna (1998) pointed out, this was 
partly due to greater student enrolment in universities and the rise in expectations for social 
returns from the society. These two events introduced  irreconcilable dichotomy between the 
traditional task of curiosity driven research and research driven by societal need (Geuna 2001). 
This friction led to the institutionalization of new academic functions, such as “pursuing 
knowledge and its application for the creation of wealth” and “to serve the specific training and 
more general research supports needs of the knowledge-based economy at local, regional, and 
national levels” (Geuna 2001, p.617). 
These changes in the rationale for the existence and nature of knowledge creation within 
the university occurred with a radical transformation of funding sources of university research. 
The extent to which institutional setting creates incentives for the university to generate wealth 
and cooperate with firms is driven by many factors and depends on national legislation. Some of 
these are (1) the introduction of the privilege for publicly funded institution to retain intellectual 
property of an innovation and (2) competitive mechanisms for resource allocation. 
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 is a classic example of the first type of institutional change 
and paved the way for US universities to maintain ownership and patent intellectual property 
resulting from federally funded research, with provisions to share license revenues with the 
scientist/inventor (see Thursby et al., 2009). Professor privilege (professor retaining ownership 
of inventions) has been a key difference between the US and Europe, with faculty in Europe 
often providing patent rights to their research sponsors (see Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Crespi et al., 
2006; Thursby et al., 2009). Changes in some European countries to institute similar legislation 
have been occurring, such as the removal of professor’s privilege in Germany in 2002 (refer to 
Czarnitzki, 2001; Kilger and Bartenbach, 2002; Guena and Nesta, 2006). The Bayh-Dole Act 
remains the policy example of standard, and its impact on university patents in the United States 
has been analyzed extensively across several years (see Mowery et al., 2000; Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1998; Sampat et al., 2003; Mowery and Zeidonis, 2002). While the Bayh-Dole Act 
supported university ownership of innovations, several studies (Thursby and Thursby, 2005; 
Audretsch et al., 2006; Markman et al., 2006) find evidence of patent assignments outside 
universities. Thursby and Thursby (2005) find that 29% of patents in a sample across universities 
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were assigned to firms; Audretsch et al (2006) report 30% assignment of at least one patent to 
firms among scientists funded by the National Cancer Institute; in a study of more than 50 
universities, Markman et al. (2008) report a similar trend of 33% of patents assigned externally. 
Noting that some empirical studies assume patents assigned outside universities result from 
circumventing university technology transfer offices (Audretsch et al., 2006; Markman et al., 
2008), Thursby et al. (2009) ask whether patents assigned outside universities are in fact 
legitimately assigned. They consider that patents can be assigned in four types: university 
assignment, firm assignment where the inventor is a principal, firm assignment where the 
inventor is not a principal, and unassignment (ownership by the inventor). They find that firm-
assigned patents are more incremental than university-assigned patents, and that firm assignment 
of patents results largely from consulting and not university-conducted research. Additionally, 
Thursby et al. (2009) find that a higher inventor share increases the chances of university 
assignment of a patent versus firm assignment in which the inventor is a principal, but has no 
effect on other types of patent assignment. 
The second type of institutional change is discussed by Gulbrandsena and Smebyb 
(2005), who find evidence that professors involved in research with the private sector perceive 
themselves as more applied than others. Reduced public funding availability in Europe (Guena 
and Nesta, 2006) and competitiveness among universities for public funds has created incentives 
for private and nonprofit funding partnerships. Czarnitski et al. (2007) find differences in 
scientific performance based on funding source among German professors: Patents in partnership 
with nonprofits enhance performance whereas corporate patents negatively affect scientific 
performance. Geuna and Nesta (2006) show there is an effect impact of a growing number of 
patents after the shift of university funding, but this effect is heterogeneous among sectors.  
Most studies have examined the overall number of university patents resulting from 
funding changes or policy changes. Yet counting total patents does not provide the full story (see 
Marco, 2006), and the technological importance of an invention (Hagedorn and Cloot, 2003; 
Trajtenberg, 1990; Henderson et al., 1995) is the basis for a subgroup of studies on the quality of 
patents. Understanding the determinants of patent quality can yield important implications for 
ongoing policy design, particularly as more countries around the world are adopting Bayh-Dole 
types of legislation. However, evidence on the quality of patents is not conclusive, and typically 
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when data are available, they are difficult to disaggregate by funding source. For instance, 
Henderson et al. (1998) show a decrease in the quality of university patents between 1965 and 
1988 at the aggregate level. Instead of looking at originality, they used a measure of quality as 
the dependent variable, which is a non normalized measure of total citations. Their key finding is 
that the relative importance and generality of university patents declined despite an overall 
increase in university patents, and this is attributed mainly to a higher number of low-quality 
patents. Mowery et. al (2001) find weak evidence of a decrease in the quality of university 
patents, which disappears if the analysis take into account the experience of the expert. Mowery 
and Zeidonis (2002) measure patent importance as citations during 6 years after issue and study 
patent trends in three US universities (University of California, Stanford University and 
Columbia University) before and after the passing of Bayh-Dole. They find no decline in 
importance or generality of patents issued after 1980 at University of California and Stanford 
University; they find overall that the effects of Bayh-Dole may be “as important as any effects of 
the act on the internal research culture” of US universities (Mowery and Zeidonis,2002,pg.399). 
Aldridge and Audretsch (2011) find that over twenty-five percent of scientists who have at least 
one patent start a firm.  
In this paper, we surmise that both types of research activities still coexist within the 
university: Publicly-funded research and privately co-funded applied research. Thus, we 
investigate whether this change in the social mission of the university and the related change in 
funding sources negatively affected the originality of university patents. 
This broad hypothesis is rooted in the trade-off between curiosity-driven research and 
research driven by societal need. In order to answer this question, we test for the impact of 
financing sources of projects which led to patent production. We identify university research 
which is financed directly by the university and federal projects issued through tender or funded 
by the private sector, thereby creating as a sample allowing us to observe whether the primary 
source of investment is federal, industry, university or nonprofit funding. Along the line of 
reasoning discussed above, we expect that publicly funded research should be more original than 
privately funded research. 
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2.1. Hypotheses 
In the theoretical framework, we suggest that university research is a key instrument for 
keeping a reasonable allocation of resources employed towards the exploration of new areas in 
technological space; mitigating the risk of lock-in of the cumulative and selective nature of the 
discovery process is a related concern with important implications, inside and outside 
universities. Recent changes in the funding rationale of academic research might have modified 
incentives schemes (for more see Guena and Nesta, 2006; Czarnitzki, 2001) and thus, challenge 
the task of university research behavior.  
Past research showed that originality, a measured based on patents citation counts, may 
be mildly decreasing over time. However, this is not always supported (Mowery and Zeidonis, 
2002) or not conclusive and becomes not significant when other controls are added (see Mowery 
et al., 2001 and Aldridge and Audretsch, 2011). 
We argue that whether a patent is assigned to a university or not is not the correct 
explanatory variable to grasp the effect of the changed incentives schemes upon the originality of 
the research (see Marco, 2006, for a discussion of patent counts). What really matters is the 
trade-off between curiosity-driven research and research driven by societal need. In order to 
disentangle these effects, we conclude that for each patent, it is worth examining the funding 
source of its specific project. This information may help explain the variation in originality 
across patents. Indeed, within the universities various types of funding schemes can coexist, such 
as public, private, profit or non-profit. 
First, along the lines discussed above, we expect that a patent funded by the university to 
be on average more original than other. This effect might bring more empirical evidence to the 
ongoing discussion about the quality of the university patents. The big picture by Henderson et 
al. (1998) that academic research has declined in quality over time has already been mitigated by 
other studies looking at more disaggregate levels. Moreover, academic patent quality depends on 
factors including sector, university, technology transfer office (Mowery, 2001; Mowery and 
Zeidonis, 2002). This paper could add further ease Henderson et al. (1998).   
Hypothesis 1: university funded projects lead to patents of higher originality 
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Secondly, we can argue the opposite for privately funded research: if firms have few 
incentives to perform basic and original research because of lack of appropriability and inherent 
uncertainty, we can expect that they also fund less original research  
Hypothesis 2: privately funded projects lead to patents of lower originality 
Third, university funded research is not the only mechanismthatgovernment can finance 
research activities. Indeed, we should distinguish among two different kinds of public funding: 
university-based and direct government funding based on calls for application. This distinction is 
crucial because government projects are not usually oriented toward existing societal needs 
(Geuna 2001) and thus, can probably reinforce path-dependence of mainstream science and 
technology, not necessarily pushing for original research.  
Hypothesis 3: government funded projects lead to patents of lower originality 
Fourth, the legal and economic status of the source of the funding should also be taken 
into account; therefore, we look at profit versus non-profit status of the funding organization. 
The direction of this effect is not clear a priori. To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies 
examining this question and existing theory does not yield a clear hypothesis. Hull and Lio 
(2006) develop a model to assess the innovation propensity of non-profit organizations and 
discuss the complex interactions among three elements which differ between profit and non-
profits: strategic vision, financial constraints and strategic constraints. Their model is a useful 
way to categorize the discussion but does not provide any direct hypotheses. Furthermore, we 
investigate whether the non-profit nature of the source of funding has any effects. We do not 
formulate an explicit research hypothesis here. 
3. Material and Methods 
3.1 Data 
We use two data sources. The first is the NBER U.S. Patent Citations Data File, which 
contains for each patent granted by the USPTO between 1975-2006 citation data and 
technological class of belonging of a patent. Secondly, we use information on scientists who 
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have been awarded a Nationcal Cancer Institute (NCI) grant in the years 1998-2004. Patent 
records have been match with the NCI recipient scientists, using Structured Query Language 
(SQL) coded to extract and manipulate data. As taken from Audretsch et al 2006, a match 
between the patentee and NCI awardee databases was considered to be positive if all four of the 
following necessary conditions were met: 
(1) A positive match was made with the first, middle, and last name. If, for example, the 
scientist did not have a middle name listed on either the NCI award database or the patent 
database, but did have a positive first and last name, this first condition was considered to be 
fulfilled. 
(2) The second criterion involved matching the relevant time periods between the two 
databases. Observations from both databases were matched over the time period 1998-2004, 
which corresponds to the initial year in which observations were available from the NCI database 
(1998-2002) and the final year in which patents were recorded in the patent database (1975-
2004). Because applications of patents may take anywhere from three months to two years to be 
issued, the 2003 and 2004 USPTO patent records were included in our query. Issued patents 
from 1998 to 2004 by NCI scientists fulfilled the second criterion. 
(3) The third criterion was based on location. If the patentee resided within an 
approximate radius of 60 miles from the geographic location of the university, the third condition 
was fulfilled. 
(4) The fourth criterion was based on USPTO patent classification. Using the USPTO 
patent classification code, all patents were separated into respective coding groups. Patents 
which did not fall under the traditional categories of biotechnology were identified. All non-
biotech patents were evaluated, and patents such as “Bread Alfalfa Enhancer” were rejected as 
an NCI scientist patent (see Appendix A for a distribution of patent categories).Based on these 
four matched criteria, a subset of 65 distinctly issued patentees were identified between 1998 and 
2004 with a total of 167 patents who responded to a set of questions including: 
Did you have any other major sources of funding (totaling over $750 thousand) (yes/no):  
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If yes, please choose the source(s) of funding that apply:  
A) Nonprofit B) Governmental C) Your University/Institution D) Industry E) Other  
53.2 Variables 
, The dependent variable of the model is patent originality. Following Tratjenberg et. al 
(1996), we estimate the originality of each patent in the dataset. This is calculated as an index 
score measuring each patent’s prior patent citations. Funding source is operationalized as coming 
from university, nonprofit, industry or government. In addition, total NCI grant funding, a 
primary source of government funding for the period 2000-2004, is measured for each scientist. 
Following Aldridge and Audretsch (2011), we include variables for both human capital and 
industry linkage. Human capital is operationalized by measuring average citations per 
publication in ISI, reported for each scientist from 2000 to 2004. Scientist-industry linkages are 
operationalized by two variables selected to reflect scientist connections to private industry. The 
first measure of social capital is board membership, a binary variable reflecting scientist 
participation on a board of directors or scientific advisory board. The second measure of social 
capital is industry co-publications, counted as the number of ISI publications an NCI scientist 
shared with a private industry employee who had an address field of co, corp, inc, ltd, llc and/or 
coltd. The third measure of social capital is industry-research lab co-publications, counted as the 
number of ISI publications an NCI scientist shared with a private industry employee who had an 
address field of reslab.   
Based on Levin and Stephan (1991) and Stephan and Levin (1992), and following 
Aldridge and Audretsch (2011), we include controls for scientist age and gender. Scientist age is 
calculated from the year the scientist was born; gender is reported as a dummy variable, where a 
male scientist is assigned a value of one and a female is assigned a value of zero. The effects of a 
scientist’s institution context are controlled for in two variables. The first variable of Public 
Institution is included due to the differing nature of private and public intellectual property 
                                                            
5 The 65 patenting scientists were “Googled” to obtain their e-mail and telephone information. 
The records could generally be found by typing their full name, university and the word “oncology”. The 
ensuing patentee e-mail accounts and telephone numbers were then collected and registered in the 
scientist database.  
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ownership. The second variable identifies if the scientist’s university was a recognized NCI 
Comprehensive Center. This variable controls for any potential agglomerating effects of 
knowledge specialization at the scientist university. 
The next section controls for the quality of patent. The universities TTO age is controlled 
for due to the potential quality of TTO office. For example, an older TTO may have more 
experience and knowledge in a patent application and therefore identify less backward patent 
citations in its application. The second variable is number of prior patents. Using Stuart (xx) we 
control for the number of patents issued to the scientist prior to 2000. We also control for the 
type of patent which was issued using the NBER two digit patent classification code. This 
control, for example, allows us to control if the scientist was issued a patent in the subfield of 
drugs or medical instruments.  
[Table 1. Dependent Variable] 
[Table 2.Description of Independent Variables.] 
 
 
[Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations.] 
 
 
3.3 The model 
We use this data we aim at testing a series of hypotheses concerning the source of funding as 
determinant of a patent’s originality (O). Thus, we suggest a model where the variation in the originality 
of a patent is explained by its source of funding (S) and by other covariates which might affect the 
variance of the dependent variable as well. Specifically, we consider three groups of controls. The first 
one consists of  demographic characteristics (D) of the inventor such as gender or age and they proxy the 
different attitude towards research in the life cycle of an individual. Others variables try to capture some 
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unobservable quality of the scientist linked with her human capital, her linkage with the industry, the 
quality of the institution she is coming from (T). The third group of controls consists of industry dummies 
and takes into account the different research patterns across industries (I). We thus, estimate the following 
model: ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?    (1) 
where O is the vector of n observations of patent originality, S is a n × p-1 matrix, where p is the 
number of dummies variables indicating the sources of funding, and D, T, and I are the matrix of 
observations for each control group. ? is the vector of error terms. Although we control for various 
factors, which capture various source of heterogeneity of the sample, heteroskedasticty cannot be 
excluded This issue is solved by using a robust estimation of the variance matrix. Concerning the 
issue of endogeneity, it should be noticed that we derive originality from a dataset of patents; 
patents are an output of the discovery process. . Second, we explain originality with inputs of the 
discovery process – i.e, funding sources.  Thus,  reverse causality should not be a concern.  
Morevoer,  assuming a more complex process of innovation,, a correlation between covariates 
and the error terms, if any, would increase the standard deviation and reduce accuracy of our 
estimator. However, the sign of the coefficients would remain unchanged. For this reason, in the 
worst case scenario, the estimator would be almost consistent and, thus, not excessively affect 
the interpretation of the results. In the following sections, we describe the data the variables, and 
present the results of regression 
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3.4 Results and discussion 
Table 4 depicts six models which differ in the number of controls used. Results hold 
across models and explain 30% of the variance of originality. Given the complexity of the 
research process, the use of patents as a problematic proxy for inventive activity, and the size of 
the sample, we consider a fitness of 30% as satisfying. The strongest result is that the university 
funding has a positive impact on the originality of a patent. This result is in line with the 
expectation aor the first hypothesis and challenges the common view that university patents have 
a lower quality on average. The focal point is not whether a patent is assigned to a university or 
not but its source of funding. Only in cases where university is the source of funding does 
university research maintain its traditional role of pursuing original research. 
In addition, the other sources of funding do not have a significant impact on the 
originality of a patent. In other words, while a negative or non-existing effect of private funding 
is the expected result of hypothesis 2, the non–significance of governmental funding is a robust 
one which challenges the common view of the policy makers. As previously discussed, few 
scholars in the economics of science highlighted that the new rationale in governmental funding 
allocation based on competitive call for application might distort a researcher’s incentives to 
explore original paths (Geuna, 2001). However, this is the first empirical observation of this 
effect. Both the previous theories on the issue and this piece of evidence suggest hat if the aim is 
to allocate resources to a pure curiosity driven research, which mitigate the path-dependency of a 
system, a government should leave freedom to universities. The null or non-significant 
coefficient of NCI grant further strengthens this implication: funding made available for cancer 
research are not supposed to run the risk of being employed in dead-end projects. Also the profit 
vs. non-profit nature is not significant. Non-profit organizations have a very complex difference 
and difference strategic and financial constraints from private one. According to this research, 
the net effect does not point toward the creation of original knowledge.  
We then have a set of variables which control for the talent and the linkages of an author 
with the institutional setting. The negative and significant impact of average ISI citation number 
per publication of an author suggests that originality is not necessarily always a breakthrough in 
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the scientific paradigm. On the contrary, if path dependency is not a problem per se, original 
projects turn very frequent to be unsuccessful or to reach a dead-end.  
The variables controlling for the linkages of a scientist with the institutional setting 
corroborate the idea that originality is stronger for those authors focused on their university work 
only. If an author sits in a board of directors or in an advisory board, she will produce less 
original patents. On the contrary, co-publishing with a private company or with a research lab 
and having a direct affiliation to a university or a NCI center does not have a significant effect. 
[Table 4. Regressions] 
Models 3-5 include dummies for the main technological class of the patent. They do not 
report a significant coefficient with the exception of the dummies for  “drugand medical” which 
has a negative impact on originality. Once again, a very applied field with routinized  innovation 
such pharmaceuticals (Nightingale, 2000) shows little originality. Finally, variables such as age 
and gender do not have any effect. Indeed, there is no reason to assume a variance of the 
propensity to be original clustered around these demographic variables. 
All in all, we can conclude that when the source of funding is not the university, 
incentives to explore the scientific and technological space outside the existing technological 
trajectories tend to vanish independently by the characteristics of the scientist. On the one hand, 
this evidence is good news and rejects the hypothesis that over time the quality of research done 
in the university has been declining. On the other hand, we should warn policy makers that the 
changed rationale for funding allocation in western countries is distorting the incentive schemes 
in a unintended way. The new task assigned to the university to generate more knowledge, which 
can be directly applied by the private sectors, seems to be fulfilled. However, the traditional role 
of the university of providing basic and original research is shrinking. Partly, this is the intended 
consequence of the creation of more linkage with industry. We also question whether 
governmental funding is intended to reduce originality and favor path-dependency or if this is an 
unintended consequence of the competitive funding allocation scheme of the governmental 
research call. 
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It has to be stressed again that path-dependency is not harmful, but on the contrary, it is 
an efficient way to organize the process of discovery. Thus, the system is facing a trade-off 
between an efficient process of discovery which might lead to lock-in situations and a costly 
process of trial and error in original research which might lead to the emergence of new 
technology and industries. The balance is a policy question, but the tools to be used should be 
carefully analysed and evaluated to avoid unintended consequences. 
As a caveat, we should admit that the incentives scheme generated by the opportunities of 
funding has a much more complex nature than what this data can grasp; thus, the vast set of 
possible effects cannot be fully disentangled here. In any case, this results call for both more 
empirical research to make this result more robust and a stronger micro based theoretical 
framework which link a researcher’s incentives and the source of funding. 
4. Conclusion 
In his Journal of Economic Literature article surveying the literature on the use of patents 
as a measure of innovative activity, Griliches (1990) points out that patents are not a 
homogeneous phenomenon but instead reflect inherent heterogeneity in the underlying value of 
the intellectual property they have been granted to protect. Griliches identifies the originality of 
patents as a key characteristic which exhibits considerable heterogeneity across intellectual 
property.   
More recently, Jaffe, A., Henderson, R. and M. Trajtenberg (1998) and Jaffe, Trajtenberg 
and Romer (2005) have succeeded in addressing Griliches’ (1990) concern about patent 
heterogeneity by developing  methodologies for measuring the degree of originality associated 
with any given patent.  In fact, a growing body of empirical work confirms Griliches’ (1990) 
assertion about the inherent variability of patent originality.  
Patent originality, which reflects a highly original value of the underling scientific 
research, has been long recognized (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988) in fostering the 
emergence of new technologies and industries. However, while a large body of literature exists 
measuring the impact of patent originality on a broad range of measures of firm performance, 
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this paper is the first study to actually ask why some patents are more original than others. The 
hypotheses and empirical results confirmed in this paper suggest that the answer has to do with 
the heterogeneous nature of the underlying research undertaken by the university scientist 
granted the patent. Research which is supported by the industry tends to generate patents which 
are less original in nature. By contrast, research supported by universities, which has less of an 
applied focus, tends to generate patents which have a greater degree of originality. 
An important qualification of these findings is that they apply only to a limited area of 
science and technology. Future research needs to examine the determinants of patent originality 
for a broader scope of scientific and research contexts. 
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[Table 1. Dependent Variable] 
Dependent Variable 
 
Description 
 
Originality                                          
An index score measuring how radical each patent was by measuring the 
patent’s prior patent citations 
 
[Table 2.Description of Independent Variables.] 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Description 
 
University Funding 
Binary variable, for scientists indicating that they received at least $750,000 
of funding from a university source, University Funding=1 
Nonprofit Funding 
Binary variable, for scientists indicating that they received at least $750,000 
of funding from a university source, Nonprofit Funding=1 
Industry  Funding 
Binary variable, for scientists indicating that they received at least $750,000 
of funding from a for‐profit source, Private Funding=1 
Government Funding 
Binary variable, for scientists indicating that they received at least $750,000 
of funding from a governmental source, Government Funding=1 
NCI Grant Total amount of NCI funding received by a scientist from 2000 to 2004 
Avgcipub The average citation per publication in ISI from 2000 to 2004 
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Industry Co‐Pub The number of ISI publications a NCI scientist shared with a private industry 
employee who had an address field of; co, corp, inc, ltd, llc, and or coltd  
Industry ResLab Co‐Pub The number of ISI publications a NCI scientist shared with a private industry 
employee who had an address field of; reslab 
OnBoardDirect 
Binary variable, for scientists indicating that they sat on either a board of 
directors or science advisory board, Board=1 
Scientist Age The year the scientist was born 
Male Binary variable, where a male=1 
TTOFoundYear Year when the scientist’s university TTO was founded 
Public Institution 
Binary variable, for a scientist who was affiliated to a public university, 
Public Institution=1 
NciComcenter 
Binary variable, for a scientist whose institution is recognized by NCI as a 
comprehensive center for cancer research, NCI Center=1 
Prior Patents Count, The number of issued patents a scientist had, 1975 – 1998 
 Two Digit NBER Patent Sub 
Category Code; 
 
PCResins   Two digit patent subcategory in the patent field of Chemicals 
 PCBio Tech Two digit patent subcategory in the patent field of Drugs and Medical 
PCMiscel. Chem  Two digit patent subcategory in the patent field of Chemical 
PCComputer Hard/Software 
Two digit patent subcategory in the patent field of Computers and 
Communications 
PCSurgery and Med Inst Two digit patent subcategory in the patent field of Drugs and Medical 
PCOrganic Componds Two digit patent subcategory in the patent field of Chemical 
PCDrugs  Two digit patent subcategory in the patent field of Drugs and Medical 
 
[Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations.] 
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Variable   Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
         
Patent Originality  167 0.327  0.289  0  0.826 
University Funding  167 0.156  0.364  0  1 
Nonprofit Funding  167 0.168  0.375  0  1 
Industry Funding  167 0.329  0.471  0  1 
Government Funding  167 0.365  0.483  0  1 
         
NCI Grant   167 $2,578,126 $1,612,474 $1,194,332 $9,009,597 
Avgcipub   167 26.662  22.068  1.667  130.365 
Industry Co‐Pub  167 3.467  4.475  0  27 
Industry ResLab Co‐Pub  167 0.246  1.832  0  23 
Onboarddirct   167 0.605  0.490  0  1 
         
Scientist Age   167 57.078  7.376  41  73 
Male    167 0.880  0.326  0  1 
Ttofoundyear   167 1981.138 8.739  1940  1996 
Public Institution  167 0.461  0.500  0  1 
Nci Compcenter  167 0.515  0.501  0  1 
         
Prior1998patents  167 6.257  6.697  0  27 
 PCResins   167 0.216  0.412  0  1 
PCBio Tech   167 0.683  0.467  0  1 
 PCMiscel. Chem  167 0.066  0.249  0  1 
 PCComputer Hard/Software 167 0.060  0.238  0  1 
         
PCSurgery and Med Inst  167 0.102  0.303  0  1 
PCOrganic Componds  167 0.323  0.469  0  1 
PCDrugs   167 0.377  0.486  0  1 
 
 
 
 
 
[Table 4. Regressions] 
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Dependent Variable originality originality originality originality originality
University Funding 0.243 0.327 0.34 0.266 0.25
(2.60)* (4.10)** (3.31)** (2.23)* (2.23)*
Governmental 
Funding ‐0.049 ‐0.051 ‐0.031 ‐0.027
‐0.86 ‐0.96 ‐0.56 ‐0.46
Industry Funding ‐0.039 0.013 0.035 0.05 0.053
‐0.54 ‐0.19 ‐0.54 ‐0.72 ‐0.76
Nonprofit Funding 0.033 ‐0.043 ‐0.058 ‐0.08 ‐0.074
‐0.35 ‐0.45 ‐0.52 ‐0.72 ‐0.66
NCI Grant 0 0 0 0
(1.80)+ ‐1.36 ‐0.95 ‐0.91
AvgCiPub ‐0.004 ‐0.005 ‐0.006 ‐0.006
(3.79)** (3.94)** (4.32)** (4.32)**
Industry Co‐Pub 0 0.001 0.003 0.002
‐0.03 ‐0.12 ‐0.39 ‐0.35
Industry Reslab Co‐
Pub 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003
‐0.88 ‐0.72 ‐0.51 ‐0.39
OnBoardDirct ‐0.126 ‐0.146 ‐0.121 ‐0.126
(2.22)* (2.29)* (1.84)+ (1.88)+
Scientist Age 0.001 0.003 0.003
‐0.25 ‐0.92 ‐0.87
Male 0.058 0.075 0.081
‐0.64 ‐0.79 ‐0.84
TtoFoundYear ‐0.003 ‐0.005 ‐0.005
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‐0.86 ‐1.38 ‐1.5
Public Institution ‐0.071 ‐0.088 ‐0.087
‐1.17 ‐1.37 ‐1.38
NciCompCenter 0.016 0.01 0.018
‐0.28 ‐0.17 ‐0.35
PCResins ‐0.069 ‐0.059
‐0.47 ‐0.41
PCBio Tech ‐0.166 ‐0.161
‐1.14 ‐1.13
PCMisc. Chem  ‐0.142 ‐0.136
‐1.01 ‐0.99
PCSurgery and Med 
Instrm.  ‐0.022 ‐0.021
‐0.29 ‐0.27
 PCOrganic 
Compounds  ‐0.084 ‐0.079
‐1.21 ‐1.16
PCDrugs ‐0.104 ‐0.104
(1.83)+ (1.84)+
Constant 0.315 0.561 6.09 9.774 10.27
  (6.58)** (8.26)** ‐0.93 ‐1.45 ‐1.56
Observations 167 167 167 167 167
R‐squared 0.1 0.23 0.25 0.3 0.3
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
 
